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IN Gibbons v. Ogden 1 "for the one and only time in his career on the
supreme bench, [Chief Justice] Marshall . . . pronounced a 'popular'
opinion." 2 That opinion attained its novel distinction, of course, be-
cause it destroyed the hated steamboat monopoly on the Hudson
River. Since steam navigation in 1824 was a crucial form of transporta-
tion and since the Hudson River was one of the two or three most im-
portant highways of national commerce, the unpopularity of the
monopoly is easy to understand.' But surely the New York State
legislature, which had created the monopoly (to stimulate the develop-
ment of steam navigation) was not insulated from the heat of popular
dissatisfaction with the situation on the Hudson. Why had it not
abolished its creature-its purpose having been accomplished-years
before protracted litigation came to a weary end in Gibbons v. Ogden?
A legislature less in harmony with "popular" social pressures than a
court is a phenomenon that invites exploration. In this case, one need
go no further for the explanation than John Marshall's earlier opinions
in Fletcher v. Peck 4 and the Dartmouth College case, 5 Where, as Professor
Corwin has shown, the doctrine of vested interests was established as
the first basic principle of American constitutional law. Both "natural
justice" and the clause prohibiting impairment of the obligation of
contract, according to Marshall, prohibit a state legislature from modi-
fying its own acts to the detriment of interests which have vested
thereunder. The important factor is the sanctity of private property.
Even public property (Fletcher v. Peck) and the public interest in edu-
cation (Dartmouth College case) must be subsumed to it. That senti-
ment, of course, came straight from Blackstone's codification-"so
great . . . is the regard of the law for private property, that it will
not authorize the least violation of it; no not even for the general good
of the whole community." 6
t Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824).
2. 4 BEmV GEa, TnE LIFE OF JoHN MAsHALL 445 (1919). See also 2 ,',Vtr=T,
THE SuPRE:E COURT iN UxIIFD SrTx.ms HIsTORY, 71-72 (1923).
3. The holders of the New "York monopoly had similar interests on the Mississippi
River which they obtained by act of the territorial legislature of Louisiana on April 19,
1811. Thus they held the key to the two most important ports in North America.
4. 6 Cranch 87 (U.S. 1810).
5. 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819).
6. 1 BL. Com-ir. *139. The Comnmontarks were first published in America in 1772. One
of the original subscribers w.as John Marshall's father, "who saw to it that his !on read
Blackstone as carefully as circumstances permitted. He had bought the boo!: for John's
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The New York legislature was well aware of the unpopularity of the
steamboat monopoly and obviously in sympathy with the desire to
abolish it. Memorials and petitions for relief from the Fulton-Living-
ston monopoly flooded the Albany legislature between Fletcher v. Peck
in 1810 and Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824. At least four select committees
studied the matter and came to the same conclusion: the steamboat
monopoly was a menace but the doctrine of vested interests-as yet
unmitigated by the concept of the police power-prohibited direct
legislative relief. The problem then became one of finding indirect
methods to accomplish what could not be done directly.
In 1807, the first successful steamboat was launched on New York
waters. In the following year, two years before Fletcher v. Peck, the
legislature of New York "for the further encouragement of steamboats
on the waters of this state" provided that "whenever Robert R. Liv-
ingston and Robert Fulton . .. shall establish one or more steam-
boats or vessels, other than that already established, they shall for
each and every such additional boat, be entitled to five years pro-
longation of their grant or contract with this state [emphasis added].
Provided nevertheless, that the whole term of their exclusive privileges,
shall not exceed thirty years after the passage of this act." I Although
there had been at least five preceding acts on the subject, that of 1808
first used the woid "contract" to describe the relation between the
state and the steamboat proprietors. Obviously someone had antici-
pated Fletcher v. Peck.8 Counsel for opponents of the monopoly threw
some light on that point before a state court in 1812. They repudiated
the idea of a contract signed, sealed, and delivered between New York
and Livingston-Fulton. "The grant wanted all the essential features
of a contract, inasmuch as it was gratuitous-without reciprocity or
mutual obligation." In short, it was "a mere permission, and the
foisting of the word contract, into the last act (which merely extended
what prior acts had already 'granted') could not alter the nature of
the grant." 9 That the word "contract" indeed had been "foisted" (by
use as much or more than for his own information." 1 BEvEIDGE, Tun LIFE OF JoUN
MARSHALL 56 (1916).
7. Act of April 9, 1811.
8. An opinion by Alexander Hamilton upon which Marshall obviously drew heavily
had been widely circulated in a pamphlet by HARPER, THE CASE OF Tun GEORnIA SALES
ON THE MISSISSIPPI, WITH A REFERENCE To LAW AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC ACTs (Phila-
delphia, 1799).
9. See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 541 (N.Y. 1812). See also Dutn, A
REPLY To MR. COLDEN'S VINDICATION OF THE STEAm-BoAT MoxoroLy 102 (Albany,
1819) : "the thirty years to Which the whole term of the grant appears to have been lindtcd
by the proviso of this clause (in the act of 1808), is computed 'from the time of the pass-
ing of the act' of 1808, instead of from the year 1803, from which the previous term com-
menced,-thus in fact extending the duration of the whole grant for five years, without
any pretense of consideration I A circumstance, which I will venture to say, was as little
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representatives of Livingston and Fulton?) upon an unsuspecting legis-
lature finds support within the act itself. For only a sentence after the
word "contract," there follows a proviso which refers to the Livingston-
Fulton interests as "exclusive privileges" rather than contractual
rights.
The unusual use of the word "contract" in the statute pointed the
line of defense which the steamboat proprietors persistently used in all
clashes with the legislature. Two prominent lawyers, Thomas A. Emmet
and Cadwallader D. Colden, represented Fulton and Livingston before
the Duer Committee (the first select committee appointed to consider a
petition for relief against the monopoly) and also before a "joint" session
of the legislature which heard the committee report and arguments
against it.10 To Emmet and Colden, it was obvious that a contract
had been consumated:
"That the nature of the engagement between Messrs. Livingston
and Fulton and the state might be well understood, the legislature
also spoke of it as a contract. And I ask, has it not all the features
of a contract? It is a mutual agreement. On the one hand, Messrs.
Livingston and Fulton, offering to spend their money, and to run
the risk of employing their steamboats on the waters of this state,
provided the legislature vill grant them certain privileges; and on
the other, the state accede to their propositions, and engage, that if
they will effectively employ such boats, they shall have the con-
sideration of an exclusive privilege for a certain time." 1t
That argument, based as it was upon Fletcher v. Peck, was accepted
by the Duer Committee; ". . however inconsistent it be with the
spirit of a wise and equitable system of laws, to confer exclusive priv-
ileges . . . however contrary to the acknowledged principles of polit-
ical economy, to grant a monopoly of the elements of invention in one
understood at the time, by those who were not in the secret, as the design by which the
word contract was 'foisted' into the act." But, alas, Fletcher v. PeeP itself protected
vested interests predicated in fraud. Indeed that was one of the crucial points at issue in
Fletcher v. Peck.
10. DuE, A LEITER ADDRSSED TO CADmuxADER D. CoLrer, EsQuInn Is. Aiuswsn
TO THE SvaICrURas, CONTAI SED i His Li F OF ROBERT FULTo0.N, Uoz THE: REer? OF
THE SELECT CoimIuIT To oVHoI WAs REFERRED A MEMIORIAL REATIV TO STEAZI
NAVIGATION, PRESENTED TO THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW YomK, AT THic SESSION OF 1814
48 (Albany, 1817). Mr. Duer later became President of Columbia College of New York.
11. A VmSicATiox, By CADwALLADER D. Coa.DEN, OF THE ST-ai-BoT RIGHT
GRANTED BY THE STATE OF NzV YORK IN THE FoRm OF AN AiiSwaa TO THE LaIrE. OF
Ma. Duvx, ADDREssED To M. COLDEN 73 (New York, 1819). This position is particularly
interesting in view of the opinion dated January 19, 1811 in which Mr. Emmet advised his
clients that their monopoly was invalid since "after the adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion no State Legislature had any authority to grant an exclusive right of making, con-
structing, or employing any machine or invention.' 13 N. Y. LnsaAnv Bull. 573.
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whole department of discovery; yet if the legislature have fallen into
this error; if they have actually vested in individuals, rights hostile in
their exercise to the general interests; they cannot on that ground avoid
or resume their own grant; they alone had authority to judge of the
expediency of the measure, and the public faith is bound by their
decision." 12
But the Duer Committee was resourceful. An Act of 1811 "for the
more effectual enforcement of" the Act of 1808 had given to Livingston
and Fulton some extraordinary remedies amounting to outright con-
fiscation of any steamboat violating their "exclusive privileges." The
Duer Committee after observing in elaborate detail that the original
monopoly of 1808 violated the congressional commerce and patent
powers, urged that the Act of 1811 "in effect shuts the courts of justice
of this state against any person who may be desirous of bringing to a
legal test, the rights claimed by Livingston and Fulton, as by the provi-
sions of that act, the defendant of any suit to be commenced by them
. . . must lose his boat and his machinery even if he should eventually
gain his cause . . . and as this forms no part of the right of Livingston
and Fulton, being only a new remedy given them by that statute, your
committee believe there can be no doubt of the right as well as the
power of the legislature, so to alter or modify that remedy, as to pre-
vent its working manifest injustice by shutting those courts which in a
free country should be left open to every individual." 13
The Committee recognized the sanctity of the "contractual right"
(so far as legislative interference was concerned), but at the same time,
it wrote an elaborate brief on the national commerce and patent powers
for the use of any who might like to have a go in court, and then at-
tempted to distinguish between rights and mere remedies in a way
which would make litigation much easier. But as Mr. Justice Cardozo
pointed out more than a century later, "In the books there is much
talk about distinctions between changes of the substance of the con-
tract and changes of the remedy. The dividing line is at times ob-
scure." 14 Thus, Messrs. Emmet and Colden in their defense before
the "joint" session of the legislature had a ready answer:
"You insist it would be consistent with the faith of the state, to
repeal the forfeiture and other remedies given by the statutes . . .
you say it would not be contended in any other case that the legisla-
ture could not . . . alter, modify or take away remedies . . . for
the maintenance of any right whatever. Again, you are most mani-
festly wrong. It would be contended in any case where the state
had made an agreement with individuals, by which private rights
12. DuER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 8-9.
13. In Assembly, Tuesday, March 8th, 1814. The Committee to whom was referred
the Memorial and Petition of Aaron Ogden, a Citizen of the State of New Jersey.
14. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 60 (1935).
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were created and vested, and where a consequent benefit was ac-
tually given the state, and where the legislature, with the concur-
rence of the other contracting parties, had established those rem-
edies in order to secure and protect the rights created and vested by
the agreement. You illustrate your ideas by a very learned discus-
sion on the remedy of distress, by the insolvent laws, and a repeal
of the laws authorizing imprisonment for debt. What they have to
do with public faith, I confess I am at a loss to comprehend. Public
faith may well be implicated and pledged to support a specific
agreement the state has made, and the terms of a particular bargain
or the incidental sanctions of that bargain, which the legislature
has advisedly assented and acceded to, at the request of the party
with whom it made its stipulations; but I see no claim upon public
faith that can be used against the modiIfications of general remedies,
founded on no public agreements, enacted only with a view to
general policy and expediency, and in no respect stipulated for or
entering into the bargains made between the contracting parties
themselves." 15
The lower house of the legislature passed the Duer Committee bill
for the abolition of the extraordinary remedies by which the monopoly
rights were vindicated. But in the Senate, the bill failed of passage by
only one vote. 6 The attempt to circumvent Fletcher v. Peck by the
highly technical distinction between rights and remedies failed in the
New York legislature by the narrowest possible margin.
Thereafter, numerous other petitions for relief against the monopoly
were submitted and five additional select committees were appointed to
investigate. Two in 1817 17 and a third in 1822 "1 adopted in substance
the prior views and recommendations of the Duer Committee. But no
legislation altering either the monopoly's rights or its remedies was
adopted. In 1817, however, the year in which two select committees
reported adversely to the monopoly, the legislature did enact legisla-
tion imposing a special tax upon steamboat passengers. The purpose
and effect of that tax are indicated indirectly in a petition to the legis-
lature in 1819 in which the monopolists complained of the burden of
the tax and requested either that the state purchase the steamboat
business or relieve it of the tax burden. The petition is particularly
15. Coinax, op. cit. supra note 11, at 78.
16. DuER, op. cit. supra note 10, at SO-Si. See also DicKirnso.N, RoznE FuLTo.,
ENGIEER AND ARTsT, His LiFE AND WORKS 252 (1913).
17. Their reports are reproduced in full in DuE.R, op. cit. supra note 10, appendix Q
and T.
18. N. Y. AssErmiy JouRxAL. 804-806 (1822). A select committee of the Assembly
in 1820 recommended that no relief be given because the matter had been investigated
and rejected so many times previously. N. Y. ASSEMBLY JouNA. 1014-1015 (1820). A
Senate select committee in the same year recommended that no relief be given since the
matter vwas then pending in the Supreme Court of the United States. N. Y. SmEATP.
JouRNAL 215-216 (1820).
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interesting because it reveals that the monopolists were quite con-
scious of the unhappy position in which the legislature found itself,
caught as it was between the popular demands for relief and the restric-
tions of Fletcher v. Peck (by then reinforced by the Dartmouth College
case). Thus, "the petitioners suggest, that if the state should accept
this offer, it may then throw open the navigation by steam on the
Hudson River ... ." 11 No legislative action was taken in response.
Then, in the year after Gibbons v. Ogden, Mr. Colden advises us that
"since the Supreme Court of the United States had decided that the
grant to Livingston and Fulton . ..was invalid, there has been no
attempt to collect the tax on steamboat passengers." 20 Obviously the
legislature, despite the reconmendations of four select committees,
felt itself powerless under Fletcher v. Peck and the Dartmouth College
case to alter either the rights or remedies connected with the steamboat
monopoly. But to discourage the Livingston-Fulton interests, it did
resort to the tax device and that was immediately abandoned when
the monopoly was destroyed by judicial action.
Blackstone's doctrine of vested interests was indeed the first doc-
trine of American constitutional law. But no society, certainly no
democracy, could thrive on the pristine simplicity of such a foundation.
Even Marshall came by degrees to recognize that. In Fletcher v. :Peck
the public interest got rough treatment and little lip service. But
eleven years later, in the Dartmouth College case, the idea of the Police
Power is suggested:
". .. the framers of the constitution did not intend to restrain
the states in the regulation of their civil institutions adopted for
internal government." 21
Shortly thereafter, in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Police Power concept be-
comes quite explicit:
"... the acknowledged power of the state to regulate its police,
its domestic trade and to govern its own citizens may enable it to
legislate on this subject to a considerable extent." 22
and the judge who earlier had subsumed public property (Fletcher v.
Peck) and the public interest in education (Dartmouth College case) to
private property recognized that enormously valuable business interests
19. See report of the select committee to whom this petition was referred which is
reproduced in GoLDEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 93-96.
20. COLDEN, MEMOIR PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF A COMMITIE or THE COMMON
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND PRESENTED TO THE MAYOR OF NEw YORK AT
THE CELEBRATION OF THE COMPLETION OF THE NEW YORK CANALS 49 (N. Y. 1825).
21. 4 Wheat. 518, 629 (U.S. 1819).
22. 9 Wheat. 1, 208 (U.S. 1824).
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must give way before the public stake in free steam navigation on the
Hudson River.2 3 In thus recognizing that private property was not the
very apex in social values, and in permitting at least the judiciary to
protect public, at the expense of private, interests the "great Chief
Justice," as already indicated, wrote his only contemporaneously pop-
ular opinion. But Gibbons v. Ogden was merely the first crucial Ameri-
can inroad upon Blackstone's concept of the sanctity of private prop-
erty. In the first term of court following Marshall's death, Chief Jus-
tice Taney-for his Court-established the Police Power concept
upon a firm foundation:
"While the rights of property are sacredly guarded, we must not
forget, that the community also has rights, and that the happiness
and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preserva-
tion. [The court could not consent to strip away] the rights re-
served to the states [and by] mere technical reasoning take away
from them any portion of that power over their own internal police
and improvement, which is so necessary to their well-being and
prosperity." 24
23. In Willson v. Blackbird farsh Creek Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U.S. 1829), Marshall
goes his farthest in recognizing the Police Power and indeed virtually reverses his Gibbons
v. Ogden position. For in the later case he permits a state by means of a dam to obstruct
commerce on a navigable stream-even vis-a-vis a vessel operating under a federal coast-
ing license. It was the e-dstence of such a license which had been the crux of the decision
adverse to state legislation in Gibbons v. Ogden.
24. In the Charles River Bridge case (11 Pet. 420 (U.S. 1837)), Marshall's old as-
sociate and alter-ego, Mr. Justice Story, dissented and we know on his authority that
Marshall who had heard the case just before his death concurred in Story's views. For
such old Federalists as Kent, Story and Webster the Police Power doctrine of the
Charles River Bridge case "undermines the very foundations of morality confidence and
truth.... When we consider the revolution in opinion, in policy, and in numbers that
has recently changed the character of the Supreme Court, we can scarcely avoid being
reduced to a state of dispair for the commonwealth." Kent, 2 N. Y. Rnmv 337, 402
(April, 1838). For a brief account of the contest between the doctrines of Vested Interests
and Police Power from Blackstone and Bentham through Marshall and Taney, see Men-
delson, Chief Jutice Marshall and the3 Mercantile Tradition, 29 Tn Souravnsrzr n Soc.
ScL. Q. 27 (June, 1948).
Fletcher v. Peck was in effect overruled in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 460 (1882). The facts in the two cases are strikingly similar except for
the absence of any element of fraud in the later case. By 1832 the Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Field, was able to hold that "any attempted cession of the ownership and
control of the State in and over the submerged lands in Lake Michigan, by the act of
April 6, 1869, was inoperative... any such attempted operation of the act .as annulled
by the repealing act of April 15, 1873, which to that extent was valid and effective. There
can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a grantor in disregard of a
public trust. . .
